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The Influence of Good Corporate Governance Mechanism on
Earnings Management: Empirical Study in Indonesian Stock
Exchange Listed Company for Periods of 2006-2010
Hermiyetti* and Evita Nora Manik
Universitas Bakrie, Indonesia

The purpose of this research is to examine the influence of good corporate governance mechanism about earnings management in companies listed in Indonesian Stock Exchange during 2006 to
2010. The independent variables include the size of commissioner board, independent commissioner
board percentage, size of audit committee, and commissioner meeting frequency. The dependent variable is earnings management which is measured by discretionary revenue model (Stubben, 2010).
Size of company is used as the control variable in this research. The population of this research is
465 samples from companies listed at Indonesian Stock Exchange during 2006 to 2010. The sampling
method used in this research is purposive sampling method. In addition, the data analysis method
used is regression analysis and descriptive statistics. The result of this research indicates that the
mechanism of good corporate governance which is represented by the size of commissioner board,
independent commissioner board percentage, size of audit committee, and commissioner meeting frequency do not have any significant impact on earnings management. However, the result shows that
company size gave positive influence toward earning management.
Keywords: Good corporate governance, size of commissioner board, independent commissioner
board percentage, size of audit committe, commissioner meeting frequency, earnings management

Introduction
Each company is run for profit and enhances
shareholder value. In practice, employers do
not have the ability to run their own company's
operations, hence, the owner authorizes managers to run the operations of the company. Financial report is one of the tools that can be used
by owners in monitoring the performance of
managers. But the separation between owners
and managers within company could raise conflict of interest (Alwie, 2005). Managers have
tendency to take their own advantage (moral
hazard) at the expense of the principals interests. According to Xie, Davidson, and DaDalt

(2001), when the manager’s incentives based
on financial performance, it is possible that
managers are interested to improve financial
performance through earnings management.
Behind manager’s gain, earnings management
could lead to negative effects for users of financial statements because of misleading information. According to Parulian (2004), earnings
management can lead to incorrect calculation
of securities value that blur the predictive value
of securities and reduce investors’ ability in decision-making.
Parulian (2004) and Alwie (2005) stated that
earnings management behavior by managers
could be minimized by practicing good cor-
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porate governance (GCG). According Tjager
(2003), the development of corporate governance issues in Indonesia that was previously
only marginal now become a central issue since
economic crisis that hit Asia. Shareholders
and regulators have paid more attention to the
importance of the practice of good corporate
governance. Currently the basic regulation of
corporate governance in Indonesia is the Code
of Good Corporate Governance issued by the
National Committee on Governance (KNKG)
in 2006. According to the Code of Corporate
Governance, every company has to ensure the
application of the principles of good corporate
governance in every aspect of business in the
whole range of companies. Principles of good
corporate governance include transparency, accountability, responsibility, independence, and
fairness. To ensure that corporate governance
system is functioning within an organization,
there are governance mechanisms that serve
as procedures and link between decision makers and controllers. According to the context of
control, governance mechanisms divided into
two types, the external and internal mechanisms.
External mechanism, according to Syakhroza (2005), is known as the "market mechanism
in controlling company” which capital markets,
product markets, and labor markets serve as
mechanisms of corporate control. The market
mechanism will only be effective on perfect
market conditions. Meanwhile, Indonesia does
not have these characteristics so that alternative
mechanisms are needed. According Syakhroza
(2005), internal mechanisms can provide solution through governance board instrument.
Governance board mechanism, basically, is an
instrument that could be functionalized effectively since governance board has a position
as an intermediary between shareholders and
managers.
Studies about the influence of corporate governance on earnings management have been
done before. Klein (2000) examined the relationship between audit committee characteristics and earnings management director and the
results showed a negative linear relationship
between audit committee independence with
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earnings manipulation. But the relationship is
positive in which audit committee of companies
is less than the number of independent commissioners. Conversely, there is no significant relationship between earnings management with
strict rules to have a 100% independent commissioner. Xie, Davidson, and DaDalt (2001)
studied about the role of commissioners, audit
committee, and executive committee to prevent
earnings management and found that commissioner and composition of audit committees affect earnings management within company.
Research about influence of corporate governance on earnings management is also conducted in Indonesia. Ujiyantho and Pramuka
(2007) found that independent commissioner
existence has positive effect on earnings management, the size of the commissioner does
not have a significant influence on earnings
management, and together corporate governance mechanisms have a significant effect on
earnings management. Nasution and Setiawan
(2007) found that corporate governance mechanisms that include independent commissioner
composition, commissioner size, and presence
of audit committees had significant effect in
reducing earnings management practice. Nuryaman (2008) found that the composition of
the commissioners had no significant effect on
earnings management and the concentration of
individual ownership has a significant negative
impact on earnings management in manufacturing companies.
Measurement of earnings management in
several previous studies used different approaches, namely Jones, modified Jones, Beaver
and Engel model. One earnings management
measurement model that is not frequently used
in previous studies is revenue-based measurement. This revenue-based measurement model
is known as discretionary revenue that developed by Stubben (2010). Discretionary revenue
model based on existence of accounting policy
choices in revenue recognition. These options
provide management flexibility in managing
revenue recognition in that management has the
opportunity to manage reported revenue that
also give opportunities for managers practicing
earnings management.
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This study is different from previous studies for we used discretionary revenue model
measuring earnings management. This model
used because research shows that the earnings
management measurement by the income approach can reduce bias, more specific and more
powerful in detecting earnings management.
This study investigated corporate governance
mechanisms based on board governance that is
proportion of independent commissioner, the
Audit Committee size and meeting frequency
of Board of Commissioners. We conducted this
study based on problem whether corporate governance mechanisms affect earnings management. This study aims to obtain empirical evidence that corporate governance mechanisms
affect earnings management.
This study is expected to be useful as a reference for companies, readers, and study of
capital markets, especially regarding internal
mechanism of board governance and its impact
on earnings management practices. This study
is also expected to be useful for investors as a
consideration in making investment decisions.

Literature Review
Agency theory
According to Daniri (2005), agency theory
considers that the management, as a conscious
agent, will act for its own sake. In contrast,
stewardship theory says that essentially, based
on philosophical assumptions, humans can be
trusted to act responsibly, with integrity and
honesty to others. The theory is in contrast with
agency theory, in which management as the
agent can perform actions that are incompatible
with expectations and goals provided by shareholders as principals that give trust and responsibility to managers.
Agency theory has responded broadly and
seen that it reflects reality (Daniri, 2005). It is
possible that management can take action that
is incompatible with shareholders objectives.
For example, earnings management actions by
management could be detrimental for shareholders who received reports that did not reflect
the facts about company’s condition. Hence,
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supervision function is required to ensure that
management of the company is kept in control
and to ensure that the management’s decision is
in line with rules and shareholders objectives.
Good corporate governance practices in Indonesia
Reformation of corporate governance took
place in Indonesia after the 1998 economic crisis. Based on Alijoyo and Zaini (2004), since
2000 until now corporate governance evolved
from national policy level, company level, up
to the initiative of several non-governmental
organizations, which has influence on business.
The National Committee on Corporate Governance (KNKG) establishment marked GCG
reforms in August 1999. In 2004, by the regulation of Ministry of Economics Affair in KEP49/M.EKON/11/2004, government established
National Committee on Governance (KNKG)
to revitalize GCG. KNKG has a vision to make
Indonesia as one of the countries with best
governance implementation in the world. According to the KNKG Chairman, GCG could
be driven from two sides, first is from ethics
side and second is from regulation side. Encouragement from the ethical side is marked
by the issuance of general guidelines for good
corporate governance. These guidelines implementation are based on business people awareness in running business that put corporate survival, stakeholder interests, and avoid creating
an instant profit. The force of GCG implementation is held through the creation of government regulation for publicly listed companies
and to state owned enterprises. The Indonesian Capital Market Supervisory Body (BAPEPAM) through Letter No. SE-03/PM/2000 requires every public company to have an Audit
Committee. This detail is set in the Regulation
IX.I.5 in which audit committee shall consist of
at least one independent commissioner as chair
and two other members from outside company.
Stock Exchange requires public companies to
have at least 30% of the total independent commissioner and have at least three audit committee members where the presidency is held by an
independent commissioner.
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Measuring earnings management by discretionary revenue model
Stubben (2010) developed a model of earnings management measurement based on income, known as the discretionary revenue
model. This model is based on the choices of
accounting policy in terms of revenue recognition. That discretionary income is income that
has choice of accounting policy in recognition
of the reported income. In practice, the choice
of accounting policies provide opportunities to
management for practicing earnings management.
Discretionary revenue, in financial statements, cannot be directly calculated and known.
Therefore, to estimate discretionary income
value, we can use some approach via a formula. In this study we use earnings management
measurement based on estimated discretionary
revenue using the following formula:
ΔARit=α+βΔRit+εit*

1)

According to Stubben (2010), the value of
discretionary revenue is estimated by the residuals of the model. This model uses approach
where uncollected credit income is discretionary. When its income, the revenue recognition
determined by accounting policy choices, is
above average, the discretionary income can be
predicted better.
Proportion of independent commissioners
and earnings management
OECD states that non-executive board (independent commissioners) may act to take
decisions independently or as an arbiter in the
decision-making that is potentially creates conflicts of interest. In addition, an independent
commissioner may reduce agency problems
and provide advice to managers. Independent
commissioners can support the implementation
of good corporate governance within the companies through the controlling function.
Based on studies conducted by Xie et al.
(2001), Chtourou (2001), and Carcello (2006),
it can be said that the independent commission-
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er, either by their percentage or by existence,
has negative effect on earnings management
practice. This indicates that through the existence of independent commissioner practice,
earnings management could be reduced.
H1: The percentage of independent commissioner negatively affect earnings management
The size of the audit committee and earnings
management
The audit committee is a committee that is
formed to assist the commissioner in overseeing company both in terms of financial and corporate governance implementation. One of the
supervision is to avoid earnings management
practice that could harm users of financial statements because the information received does
not match reality.
Xie (2001), Chtourou (2001), and Carcello
(2006) investigated the relationship between
audit committee and earnings management.
The result of the study shows that the audit
committee with financial background is proven
to reduce earnings management practices.
H2: The size of the audit committee has a negative influence on earnings management
Number of board meetings and earnings
management
Board of commissioners coordinates to control management in operating company. One
form of coordination can be seen from the official meeting of the board of commissioners.
Xie et al. (2001) found that meeting frequency
of the Board of commissioners has a negative
influence on earnings management. This indicates that the more often the board of commissioners holds meetings, the smaller the earnings
management level within companies.
H3: The number of board of commissioners has
a negative influence on earnings management
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Research Method
Population, sample, and sampling technique
The population of this study is the listed
companies in the Indonesian Stock Exchange
during 2006-2010 except financial industry
companies. The financial industry is not included in this study because it has special characteristics that are different from other industries.
This study uses purposive sampling as sample
selection method. Sample selection is based on
the following criteria: i) companies must be
listed in the Stock Exchange from 2006 to 2010
consistently; ii) the company’s annual reports
and financial statements for the period of 2006,
2007, 2008, 2009, and 2010 are consistently
accessible to researchers; and iii) GCG data
required is available in the company's annual
report for the period of 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009,
and 2010. The data used is the secondary data
that is taken from the company's annual report
and financial data from the Indonesia Stock Exchange (BEI) and the Indonesian Capital Market Directory (ICMD). To obtain the required
data, we use research archive method.
Operationalization of variables
The examined variables in this research
consist of independent variables, dependent
variable, and control variable. The independent
variables include size of commissioner board,
independent commissioner board percentage,
size of audit committee, and commissioner
meeting frequency. The dependent variable is
earnings management which is measured by
discretionary revenue model (Stubben, 2010).
Size of the company is used as the control variable in this research.
The measurement of each variable is:
- Independent variables:
• Percentage of independent commissioner,
the composition of the independent commissioner of the total board of commissioners;
• The size of audit committee, the number of
the company's audit committee member;
• Frequency of board meeting, the number of
56
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board meetings in one year
• Company size, as a control variable, the
natural logarithm of total assets at year end.
Dependent variable:
• Earnings management, proxied by discretionary revenue with the model developed
by Stubben (2010). The formulation of the
model are:
ΔARit=α+βΔRit+εit*

2)

In accordance with the model:
ΔARit : account receivable change in the 		
		years i
ΔRit : revenue change in the years i
εit
: residual model in the years i
Discretionary revenue as the proxy earning
management is the residual of the model

Result and Discussion
Object description of research
Based on IDX data, the total companies listed on the Stock Exchange during 2006-2010 are
450 listed companies and companies that meet
sampling criteria are 93 companies. Thus, the
amount of observation data used in this study
consisted of 465 data during the study five
years period from 2006-2010. During research
was held, it was found that there were 25 outliers data so that the net number of used samples
are 440 observations.
Descriptive statistics
Statistical value in the initial data processing
has not produced normally distributed data. According to Gujarati (2006) and Levine (2008),
the functional form of regression by transformation data into log-linear form or natural logarithm form can be used to overcome them. In
addition, data outliers were excluded from the
sample because it has value beyond the average
value of the data used (Levine, 2008). Table 1
presents the descriptive statistical results of the
study.
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics
lnΔAR

N

Minimum

Maximum

Mean

Std. deviation

440

16,95

28,23

24,3761

1,99427

lnΔREV

440

17,69

31,08

26,2019

2,13467

DISCREV

440

-3,5812

3,4616

0.000000

1,2644237

lnKI

440

-1,61

0,00

-0,9135

0,26253

lnKA

440

0,69

1,95

1,1613

0,18465

lnFM

440

0,00

3,50

1,6372

0,65683

SIZE

440

20,16

32,36

28,5271

1,60255

Valid N (listwise)

440

Table 2. Regression analysis of first model (discretionary revenue)
Variable

Coefficient

t-stat

Sig.

Constant

5.446

7.320

.000

lnΔREV

.722

25.526

.000*

N

440

R2

0.598

F-statistic
Prob. F-stat

651.577
0.000 *

Variable dependent
lnΔAR = Account receivable changes year i
Variable independent
lnΔREV = Revenue changes year i
*Significant at 5% confidence level

Test of classical assumptions in first model
(discretionary revenue)
Normality test
Based on normality test using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test on discretionary revenue
model data, it can be seen that the significance
value is <0.05 which is valued at 0.000. Thus,
there is an indication that the research data is
not normal. After we used functional form of
the model, test of Kolmogorov-Smirnov shows
that the value of significance was greater than
0.05 which is equal to 0.876. Hence, it can be
concluded that the data in this model has no
normality problem.
Autocorrelation test
The table of critical values Durbin-Watson
(DW) shows that for n = 440, k = 1, and e = 5%,
the value of dl = 1.84 and du = 1.85. Based on
the test, it is known that the value of d = 1.878.
Because the DW value is greater than du (1.85)
and less than 4-du (2.15), we can interpret that
the data has no autocorrelation problem.
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Linearity test
Linearity test in this study uses Glejser test.
Based on Glejser test known that discretionary
revenue variable has a value below the significance probability of 0.000 to 0.05, which can
be interpreted that the discretionary revenue
data does have no linearity problem.
The classical model assumptions test
Normality test
Based on normality test performed by using
the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test on discretionary
revenue model data, it can be seen that the significance value <0.05, which is valued at 0.000.
Thus, there is an indication that research data
is not normal. After we used functional form of
the model, test of Kolmogorov-Smirnov shows
that the value of significance was greater than
0.05, which is equal to 0.925. Hence, it can be
concluded that the data in this model has no
normality problem.
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Table 3. Regression analysis of second model
Variable
Coefficient
Constant
-4.924
lnIC
0.147
lnAC
-0.331
lnMF
0.090
SIZE
0.186
N
440
0,055
R2
F-statistic
6,278
Prob. F-stat
0,000*
Variable dependent
DISCREV (Discretionary Revenue) = Proxy of Earnings Management
(Stubben, 2010)
Variable independent
AC= Audit committee size
IC= Percentage of independent commissioner
MF=Meeting frequency of the board of commissioner
SIZE=Company size= Natural logarithm of asset

t-stat
-4.488
0.646
-0.918
0.973
4.536

Sig.
0.000
0.519
0.359
0.331
0.000*

*Significant at 5% confidence level

Multicollinearity test
There is no tolerance values below 0.10
(tolerance values ranged from 0.786 to 0.974).
Moreover, there is no VIF values above 10 (VIF
values ranged from 1.027 to 1.271). Hence, we
can conclude that data have no multicollinearity problem.
Autocorrelation test
Tables of critical values Durbin-Watson
(DW) shows that for n = 440, k = 4, and e =
5%, the value dl = 1.83 and du = 1.86. Based on
the test, it is known that the value of d = 1.946.
Since the DW value is greater than du (1.86)
and less than 4-du (2.14), it can be interpreted
that the data has no autocorrelation problem.
Linearity test
Linearity test in this study using Glejser Test.
Based on Glejser test, it is known that discretionary revenue variable has a value below the
significance probability of 0.000 to 0.05, which
then can be interpreted that the discretionary
revenue data does not have linearity problem.
Regression analysis
Based on statistic test, it was found that the
calculated F value is 651.577 and significant
at the 5% significance level. Similarly, the ob58
Published by UI Scholars Hub, 2013

tained t-stat is 25.526 and significant at the 5%
significance level. Both of the tests showed that
receivables changes as an independent variable
affects income changes value and the effect is
significant. This indicates there is a correlation
between accounts receivable change with income change. Income changes can be used to
predict future receivable changes. This is because if present revenue is not directly earned
by the company, the revenue is recognized as a
receivable and the accounts will affect changes
of present receivable and change in future accounts receivable when it has been received.
This is related to income that is not influence
the choice of accounting policy for recognition of revenue cycle changes associated with
changes in accounts receivable.
R2 or the coefficient of determination in the
regression models demonstrated the ability of
income change to predict receivable changes.
Based on regression result, the determination
coefficient was 0.598, indicating that 59.8%
change in accounts receivable can be explained
by income changes and for the remaining 40.2%
by factors other than income changes. There is
a possibility that receivable changes that cannot be predicted by changes in revenue related
to the accounting policies selection in revenue
recognition. The choice gives an opportunity
for management to use policy that can meet
management goals. This is related to earnings
management practices which management attempt to take advantage from accounting policy
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Table 4. Summary of research findings
H1
H2
H3

Expected sign
(-)
(-)
(-)

Coefficient
0,147
-0,331
0,090

choices to generate recognized revenue in accordance with management’s targets.
Every residual of the model demonstrates
the value of discretionary revenue for each observation data. Value of discretionary revenue
indicates an estimated value of earnings management. Discretionary revenue shows management’s attempt to exploit the accounting
policy choices in revenue recognition in the financial statements.
Based on the regression test, we found that
the 5% significance level, calculated F-value is
6.278> F table. Because the calculated F-value
is greater than F-table, it can be interpreted that
the independent variables jointly affect the dependent variable. The significance level result
is 0.000<0.05. From the results of F-test, it can
be concluded that independent variables, that
are percentage of the independent commissioner (IC), audit committee size (AC), frequency
of the board of commissioners (MF), and company size (SIZE), jointly have significant effect
on earnings management that measured by discretionary revenue (DISCREV).
The coefficient of determination is used to
measure how far the ability of the model in explaining dependent variable. In this study, we
use R2 as the coefficient of determination value.
Based on the test results, we obtained that R2
value is equal to 0.055. This means that 5.5%
of discretionary revenue (DISCREV) variation
as a proxy of earnings management can be explained by independent commissioner percentage, audit committee size, meetings frequency
of commissioners, and company size. While the
other 94.5% can be explained by factors other
than board of governance variables such as internal and external mechanisms of the market
conditions, economic conditions, and other factors. This possibility occurred because board
of governance implementation in Indonesian
companies is to meet the minimum regulation
only, and less attention to the effectiveness of
board governance mechanisms in monitoring
https://scholarhub.ui.ac.id/icmr/vol5/iss1/5
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Significance
0,519
0,359
0,331

Description
Accepted
Accepted, but not significant
Rejected

activities. And also, according to Tjager (2003),
lack of commissioner’s independence is a special challenge in monitoring good corporate
governance implementation. Commissioners
have tendency to refract their independence,
where very strong role of commissioners and
directors that have majority stock have weakened the position of independent commissioner
in decision-making (Tjager, 2003).
As presented in Table 4, we can see that
variable percentage of independent commissioner does not proven to decrease earnings
management levels. Percentage of independent commissioners has no significant effect on
earnings management practices, which is evident from the statistical test results of counted
t-value 0.646 < t-table 1.96. It can also be seen
from the significance value of 0.519, which is
greater than the specified significance level of
0.05. This can be explained that the existence
of independent commissioner is only for meeting government regulations, so that majority
shareholders have greater control in company.
As a result, the existence of independent commissioner is only complies the existing regulations and is not intended for the enforcement of
good corporate governance (Gideon, 2005; Sylvia and Siddharta, 2005, in Ujiyantho, 2007).
These findings support the research conducted
by Nuryaman (2008) and Peasnell et al. (2000).
According to Nuryaman (2008), some of the
reasons why board of commissioners’ composition had no effect on earnings management are:
(1) empirical evidence shows that average commissioner composition is relatively low, so that
independent commissioner collectively has no
power to influence board decisions, and (2) it is
possible that board of commissioners does not
have competence in accounting and finance.
Audit committee size had no significant effect to earnings management practices, which is
evident from the counted t-value of -0.918 > ttable -1.96. It can also be seen from the significance value of 0.359, which is greater than the
59
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specified significance level of 0.05. The possibility of this was due to the interaction between
audit committees and company management in
conducting earnings management to improve
the performance of the company's management effectiveness and to achieve the maximum income (Peasnell, 2000). These findings
support the research of Peasnell et al. (2000).
This study cannot support research of Nasution
(2007), Xie, et al. (2001), and Carcello et al.
(2006). The results of this study cannot support
the theory that the greater audit committee size
will reduce earnings management practices due
to increased corporate control. This is possible
because the audit committee can interact with
company management to improve the effectiveness of management performance through
earnings management (Peasnell, 2000). In addition, according Peasnell (2000), the interaction between the audit committee and management can be done to maximize the company's
revenue.
Board of commissioners’ meeting frequency
had no significant effect on earnings management. The results of regression test shows that
at the significance level of 5%, the counted
t-value is 0.973 < t-table 1.96. It can also be
proven from the significance value of 0.331,
which is greater than the specified significance
level of 0.05. This could be occured because
it is possible that frequency of meetings is not
the main factor in controlling company’s effectiveness, but the effectiveness of the discussion and company’s condition understanding by
the board of commissioner do. The results of
this study do not support research of Xie et al.
(2001). Variable frequency of commissioners’
meeting failed to prove the hypothesis in this
study. Most likely, this is caused by the average
of commissioners meeting, which is still too
low at 5.15, and there are some companies that
only held board meeting once a year, so formal
communication cannot reduce earnings management practices within company.
Firm size is used as a control variable in this
study. Test result proved that at significance level of 5%, the counted t-value of 4.536 > t table
1.96. Because the counted t-value is bigger than
t-table, it can be interpreted that company’s size

60
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has a significant influence on earnings management practices. It can also be proven from the
significance value of 0.000, which is smaller
than the specified significance level of 0.05.
From the results we can conclude that the larger
the company, the higher the tendency for earnings management practice. This results support
research of Rahmawati (2007) that the larger
the company, the greater the level of earnings
management. This could be occured because
the larger the company, the more complex business activities carried on by the company. It can
support the manager to manage the company's
earnings for supervision and control of large
and complex company is more difficult.

Conclusion
Based on the test results and discussions of
the influence of independent commissioners
percentage (IC), audit committee size (AC), the
meetings’ frequency of commissioners (MF),
and company size to earnings management, it is
known that good corporate governance through
board governance mechanisms are not proven
to have significant influence to discretionary
revenue as the proxy of earnings management.
These three board governance mechanisms do
not show a significant effect on earnings management in companies listed on the Stock Exchange in the 2006-2010 study periods.
Due to time limitations, this study only examines the influence of corporate governance
mechanism via board governance mechanisms
(internal), and did not examine the application
of other corporate governance mechanisms,
namely external mechanism or market mechanism. Also, the selection of a relatively short
time results low-power test so that the accuracy
of the information is still relatively small.
Based on some existing limitations, the researchers suggest for future studies to use a
more broadly variable of corporate governance mechanism, the outside board governance
mechanism, to obtain more accurate results of
corporate governance mechanism. More over, a
longer study period can also be taken to study
about the effect of corporate governance mechanisms in the long run.
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